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Drivers of Convergence/Divergence of Corporate Governance Codes of 
MENA Countries 
ABSTRACT 
This study aims to fill an existing gap in the regional corporate governance research by 
investigating the extent of and the drivers behind the convergence or divergence of the corporate 
governance codes among MENA (Middle Eastern and North African) countries comparing to the 
globally known OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) principles of 
corporate governance. We build a comprehensive database of codes of corporate governance for 
a sample of 16 countries, and 83-item checklist derived from OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance for content analysis. The results of the study revealed that the convergence level of 
the codes among the countries and compared to OECD principles significantly varies among 
countries, ranging from 31% to 73%. The results show that the adopted governance principles in 
the codes are ‘decoupled’ from legitimation concerns and focus on efficiency goals. The 
macroeconomic factors of MENA countries do not consistently reflect the convergence score of 
the codes with the OECD Principles. The institutional quality factors of MENA countries are not 
aligned with their codes. A deviation between the governance indicators and the quality of codes 
is observed in most of the MENA countries. This study adds to the literature on corporate 
governance codes in one of the most distinct regions of the world. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study that systematically analyzes the convergence/divergence of the corporate 
governance codes of MENA countries by benchmarking OECD Principles and identifying the 
factors behind the convergence/divergence. The study provides several important implications 
for the regulators, firms and other stakeholders. The findings suggest some improvements in the 
corporate governance codes of the countries in the sample and draw regulators’ attention to 
important developments of corporate governance codes to enhance economic efficiency and 
legitimacy. These improvements include incorporating capital market authority into the code 
development process to better consider the expectations of investors, weakly structured sections 
of the codes need to be strengthened in the next revisions and MENA countries need to revise 
their codes in a timely manner.  
Keywords: Corporate governance codes, Convergence/Divergence, MENA countries, 
Institutional theory.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance plays a fundamental role in allocating resources across firms and even 
across countries, thus affecting how wealth is distributed between and within national economies 
(Aguilera et al. 2016; Schiehll and Martins, 2016). Moreover, corporate governance impacts how 
corporate power is channeled for the good of society. Corporate governance codes are the main 
references that shape the relevant practice of firms in nations. One of the main ongoing research 
streams is the debate around corporate governance codes convergence or divergence (Krenn, 
2016).  
Although some previously published corporate governance studies related to the MENA (Middle 
Eastern and North African) region exist, they are mainly about individual or selected countries’ 
or firms’ practices at the micro level (e.g. Bremer & Ellias, 2007; Farooq & Chetioui, 2012; 
Farooq & Seffar, 2012; Kamal Hassan, 2012; Farooq & AbdelBari, 2013; Al-Malkawi et al., 
2014). This paper covers the topic from the macro-level and regional-level standpoint through 
examining the corporate governance codes for all the sixteen MENA countries. There are several 
reasons for studying corporate governance codes in this specific region. First, the MENA region 
is one of the unique regions in the world, it not only shares similarities in culture, the absence of 
democracy, identical religion, and the same language, but also some important dissimilarities in 
legal, economic, institutional and governance foundations. Second, as the region’s oil-importing 
countries attempt to attract investors and oil-exporters attempt to diversify their oil-dependent 
economies, they seek better governance and regulatory environments.  
Even though existing studies on corporate governance practice have generated a wealth of 
knowledge regarding issues related to corporate governance codes and practices in different 
regional, legal, national contexts, they reveal gaps and raise many issues for research in the 
codes’ convergence or divergence and the drivers behind in many regions. Studying this in 
MENA countries may generate important and different findings than developed countries since 
they have different economic, legal, political and institutional backgrounds. Piesse et al. (2012) 
note that very little attention has been drawn to the corporate governance systems within MENA 
countries even though Anglo-American, Continental European, and Asian models of corporate 
governance have received great attention from researchers. Therefore, MENA countries deserve 
special attention since their political, economic, and ownership structures have many 
peculiarities. They may diverge from the Anglo-Saxon model in some respects; hence, the “one 
size fits all” approach to corporate governance, particularly the Anglo-Saxon model, might not 
necessarily be the right approach for these countries (Davies and Schlitzer, 2008). However, 
convergence on the main dimensions of corporate governance such as more independent and 
diverse boards, the establishment of board committees, and higher transparency and disclosure 
may be the preferred way forward. In addition, the development of good corporate governance 
codes for Arab countries, where legal investor protection is weak, and ownership concentration 
is high, is crucial in protecting minority shareholders from abuse by controlling shareholders 
(Omran et al., 2008). 
We aim to identify the degree of convergence and divergence of corporate governance codes of 
the MENA countries, and the drivers behind. Additionally, we aim to assess the coverage of 
corporate governance codes of these countries by comparing them to the OECD (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development) Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD 
Principles, 2015) as a benchmark. We selected the OECD Principles since it was the first 
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international body to produce a set of globally accepted standards of corporate governance 
(Solomon and Solomon, 2004). In doing so, we attempt to contribute to the improvement of the 
codes of these countries by indicating areas for further improvement.  
Furthermore, we investigate whether the driver of the codes is efficiency or legitimacy concerns 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). We aim to do this by analyzing 
economic factors and public governance factors of these countries about the development of the 
corporate governance codes and their principles. However, because some countries in the sample 
have been undergoing internal turmoil, some variables among the economic factors are missing. 
Notwithstanding, we draw significant conclusions with the available variables.  
The study aims at answering the following research questions: 
R1: How do the corporate governance codes of MENA countries converge with or diverge from 
one another? 
R2: How do the corporate governance codes of MENA countries converge with or diverge from 
the OECD Principles (2015)? 
R3: What are the main drivers of the divergence/convergence of the corporate governance codes 
of MENA countries? Are they efficiency or legitimacy related? 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The second section presents the theoretical background 
and provides a literature review regarding corporate governance codes development in various 
jurisdictions and convergence/divergence of codes. The third section provides economic and 
governance outlook of MENA countries. The fourth section outlines the methodology of the 
study which is followed by the results in the fifth section. Finally, the last section discusses the 
results, provides conclusions and implications and sets the limitations of the study. 
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES BACKGROUND 
Monitoring management performance in developing countries could be less effective where the 
institutional environment is less developed and obtaining information about companies, and their 
management performance is more difficult. Therefore, establishing a set of rules that describe 
how the management of companies should be monitored is essential to ensure that management 
maximizes the returns to investors. These rules may be legally enforced or voluntarily applied. 
Such rules constitute corporate governance codes, which outline recommendations about best 
practices and refer to issues such as shareholders’ rights, the disclosure of information, 
stakeholders’ rights, boards of directors’ responsibilities and internal control systems. Codes 
have become a widely used means to encourage companies to increase their transparency and 
accountability. Moreover, many countries have developed corporate governance codes detailing 
best practices for the effective monitoring of management, which is essential to the stability of 
financial markets; however, no definitive set of rules have emerged. This could be partly because 
of the domestic influences within each region. 
In Europe, the first code was established with the issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992. Later, 
recommendations on codes were published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 1999). National codes are generally issued for listed companies, although 
there are also codes designed for other organizations such as non-listed companies, family-
owned companies, SMEs and commercial banks. Compliance with corporate governance codes 
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differs between countries: It could be based on the “comply-or-explain” principle, which 
provides companies the option to deviate from code recommendations if they explain the reasons 
for doing so; it could be based on voluntary adoption and disclosure, or mandatory adoption can 
be required. With the worldwide adoption of corporate governance codes, researchers have 
devoted greater attention to investigate the codes’ characteristics and recently to examine the 
rationale behind their convergence or divergence among countries (e.g., Krenn, 2016; Nizaeva 
and Uyar, 2017). 
Prior literature has focused on the analysis of the content of specific national codes in a single 
country of certain European countries (e.g., Cromme, 2005 in Germany; Webb, Beck, & 
McKinnon, 2003 in the UK), Russia (Roberts, 2004), Japan (Ovsiannikov, 2017) and other 
emerging economies (e.g., Nigeria, Malaysia). Some studies focus on the influence of codes 
issued by transnational institutions on the development of national corporate governance codes 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Other studies show that the content of the codes does not 
converge, and that divergence prevails worldwide (e.g., Collier & Zaman, 2005; Hermes et al., 
2006; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Cicon et al., 2012). One of the reasons for the divergence could 
be differences in national cultures. For instance, Humphries and Whelan (2017) investigate the 
relationship between the content of corporate governance codes and national culture for 55 
countries. They find significant relationships between cultural dimensions and corporate 
governance code recommendations.  
Most of the literature investigated corporate governance codes convergence-divergence debate 
focus on classifying corporate governance codes as belongs to the Anglo-American shareholder 
model or the Eurasian stakeholder model. However, Heugens & Otten (2007) through a content 
analysis of the corporate governance codes of 38 countries, suggest other corporate governance 
systems classification based on five corporate governance logics – socially constructed, historical 
patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules. Moreover, adopting an 
institutional theory perspective, Krenn (2016) construct a theoretical framework to conceptualize 
convergence and divergence dynamics as simultaneous processes of institutional change and 
continuity, considering the influence of economic market forces, social embeddedness, and 
cultural forces. Krenn finds that convergence and divergence dynamics can coexist and lead to 
increased heterogeneity in corporate governance codes. This finding adds complexity to the 
debate and opens room for interesting research directions. 
 
In the convergence-divergence debate, a limited number of articles have empirically analyzed 
and compared the content of different national codes or examined the impact of the codes issued 
by transnational institutions on the convergence/divergence of national codes (Cuomo et al., 
2016). For example, Hermes et al. (2007) analyzed and compared the corporate governance 
codes content of seven Eastern European countries and showed that the content of corporate 
governance codes of countries is different when compared to best practices and is somehow 
shaped by forces related to country-specific characteristics of corporate governance systems. One 
of these country-specific characteristics is the type of issuer, which differs across countries. 
Therefore, analyzing the content of national codes, investigating the drivers behind their 
provisions and examining the impact of the codes issued by transnational institutions, such as 
OECD, on the convergence/divergence of national codes constitutes an important gap in the 
literature, because the outcomes may also have significant economic consequences. 
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Although agency theory is the dominant theoretical framework in studying corporate governance 
codes at the company level, the institutional theory has been increasingly adopted in country-
level studies (Cuomo et al., 2016). Institutional theory articulates convergence and divergence of 
the national corporate governance codes as processes of institutional change and offers a holistic 
perspective that considers the influence of economic market forces, social embeddedness and 
cultural forces (Krenn, 2016). Corporate governance codes reflect the institutional environment 
where they are developed (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). This institutional environment includes 
the economic system, political system, and legal system. As such, the corporate governance 
codes should reflect the prevailing influences found in the institutional environment as well as 
the type of issuer. Greco, Ferramosca & Marchi (2015) study the relationship between the types 
of issuer and the governance codes contents in the neo-institutional social theory perspective, 
using a global sample of over 70 national governance codes. They find that the national 
institutional settings shape this relationship. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) show that the 
type of institutional pressure to adopt codes varies according to the type of issuer. When codes 
are issued by the stock exchange, it represents coercive pressure; when codes are issued by a 
managers’ association, it represents mimetic pressure; when they are issued by others, it 
represents normative pressure. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazzura (2004) provide a theory to explain 
countries’ adoption of corporate governance codes. They argue that the adoption of codes may 
be based on both efficiency and legitimacy factors. Efficiency refers to the demand for codes 
from investors who believe that codes protect their interests. Legitimacy refers to pressure to 
adopt codes because of increased globalization and opened financial markets for foreign 
investors. When countries open their economy to foreign investment, they are expected to adopt 
international corporate governance practices to attract foreign capital. This proposed framework 
may be used to explain the content of codes that describe the practices of corporate governance.  
Using this framework, the content of codes in the MENA region may be explained by referring 
to two sets of factors. Efficiency factors and institutional settings may influence the content of 
corporate governance codes. Differences in corporate governance systems may lead to 
divergence in the content of codes. Therefore, codes reflect the particularities of each country’s 
distinct institutional environments. Legitimacy factors influencing corporate governance in 
MENA are globalization, the openness of financial markets for foreign investment, adoption of 
international standards and communications of international institutions such as the OECD. 
Legitimacy factors may lead to a convergence between the corporate governance codes of 
different MENA countries. However, if efficiency factors drive the content of codes, we may 
expect divergence instead of convergence of corporate governance codes among different 
MENA countries. 
Even though the prior literature noticeably enriches our knowledge of the antecedents and 
consequences of governance codes, Cuomo et al. (2016) show that there are still several 
opportunities for significant contributions in this area because there is a growing interest in 
studying codes; the academic debate is still lively and will be in the coming years. Additionally, 
Krenn (2016) calls for more theory-based research regarding the drivers of the provisions in 
corporate governance codes as a promising avenue to examine the antecedents of the coexisting 
convergence and divergence in corporate governance codes at a national and regional level. 
 Our study replies to the research call by Cuomo et al. (2016) and Krenn (2016) to extend the 
studies in corporate governance codes to provide a careful examination of the codes’ content. 
While prior studies have focused on the influence of corporate governance codes at the company 
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level (Zahra, 2014) and few comparative studies have adopted an institutional perspective to 
examine the factors that drive the adoption of specific governance principles (Schiehll and 
Martins, 2016). This study reviews country-level corporate governance codes and investigates 
the divergence/convergence of corporate governance codes of MENA countries in light of the 
ongoing discussion with respect to the institutional forces that may drive the content of corporate 
governance codes. We use the OECD principles as our point of reference. 
3. ECONOMIC AND GOVERNANCE OUTLOOK 
3.1. Economic Indicators 
In this section, we elaborate on the economic indicators of MENA countries to investigate their 
possible association with the development of the corporate governance codes in forthcoming 
sections of the paper. Therefore, the economic overview of the countries in the region is outlined 
using the following variables as detailed in table 1): oil exporters or importers, GDP per capita, 
growth rates, stock market development, and the depth of credit information to the private sector. 
The adoption of corporate governance codes by a country is a signal that indicates a commitment 
to improving its corporate governance system (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Among the 
primary receptors of this signal are trade partners, foreign financial market investors, and foreign 
direct investors. Therefore, there is a strong link between corporate governance and the 
promotion of equity markets and economic development (Paredes, 2005). Furthermore, 
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) emphasize that economic developments, internationalization, 
globalization in trade and finance, and the interconnectedness of financial markets are considered 
the impetus for the development of corporate governance codes. Thus, studying the 
macroeconomic indicators of MENA countries in relation to corporate governance code 
development is considered essential. The poor record of transparency, disclosure and reporting in 
MENA countries, which are the main pillars of corporate governance, is the main reason for the 
region to be overlooked by global long-term investors (Nadal, 2013).  
MENA countries can be classified as either oil-exporting or oil-importing countries. The purpose 
of this classification is to investigate whether there is an observable difference among MENA 
countries in the development, revision, and content of corporate governance codes. The 
reasoning is that oil importers are more likely to attempt to attract foreign capital relative to oil 
exporters since the former do not have an oil surplus to support its economic development 
compared to the latter. This is proven in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percent of 
GDP in Lebanon and Jordan, which are both oil importers far ahead of other countries with 
7.45% and 5.14%, respectively, whereas Qatar and Algeria, which are both oil exporters, have 
the least percentages at 0.87% and 0.78%, respectively1, and is even below the world average of 
2.68% (Table 1). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Although Yemen is in Table 1, we prefer not to comment on its indicators due to the ongoing severe political 
turmoil for the past several years. 
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 NA  
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36,670  
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  2.00  
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68.14  
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19.67  
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 NA  
 76.08  
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122.95 
    37,829,951  
      1,331,584  
    86,698,532  
      7,083,033  
      3,492,860  
      5,100,490  
      6,273,527  
    33,229,216  
      3,722,075  
      4,111,898  
      2,032,547  
    29,833,850  
    19,633,002  
    10,831,550  
      8,883,300  
    25,209,802  
7,133,924,855 
The comparison of GDP per capita between countries yields a substantial gap, as illustrated in 
table 1: while oil exporters such as Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman (all 
are GCC countries) enjoy wealth derived from natural resources, the others lag considerably 
behind, being under the world average of 9,832 USD. GDP growth for most of the countries in 
the sample is above the world average which is not a surprise as Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) 
show that emerging countries’ growth rates are more than double the growth rates of developed 
countries. Qatar, Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have the highest 
growth rates of the sample countries. These economies, except the oil importer, the West Bank, 
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and Gaza, appear to invest their wealth derived from natural resources in overall economic 
development. The high fluctuation in oil prices forced these countries to diversify their 
investments and reduce their oil dependence. Therefore, the adoption of a corporate governance 
code is essential for these countries because it shields them from the abuse of shareholders, 
encourages investment, helps develop capital markets, and ultimately fosters economic growth 
(Paredes, 2005).  
Regarding stock market development, which is measured by market capitalization as a percent of 
GDP, we observe high variation among countries, ranging from 22.64% in Tunisia to 85.68% in 
Jordan, and all countries except Qatar and Jordan are far below the world average. In addition, 
market capitalization ratios are below the average of developed countries (90%) (Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2013). The value level of traded stocks as a percent of GDP is even worse. All 
countries are far below the world average of 109.95%. Except for Saudi Arabia at 57.16%, all 
countries are under 20%. These stock market ratios are closely related to the number of listed 
companies in the stock markets of the region, which ranges from 43 companies in Qatar to 245 in 
Jordan. These ratios show the need to enhance market mechanisms in these countries. Thus, the 
adoption of well-developed corporate governance codes plays a major role in protecting 
shareholder interests from expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders (Paredes, 
2005). 
With respect to the depth of credit information to the private sector, which is measured by a scale 
ranging from 0 (low) to 8 (high), most MENA countries are above 6, which shows enough depth 
of credit information to the borrower. However, the amount of domestic credit provided to the 
private sector as a percentage of GDP is below the world average. Although Lebanon, Tunisia, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates are ahead of the other countries, they are 
far below the world average of 122.95. This indicates that regardless of whether the country is an 
oil-exporting or oil-importing country, it does not sufficiently provide financial support to the 
private sector. The probable alternative interpretation is that the weak growth rate of the private 
sector is correlated with low credit provision. 
3.2. Worldwide Governance Indicators 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) are six dimensions measuring the perception of 
citizens regarding the governance and institutional quality of their countries (Table 2). These 
indicators are based on data collected from over 30 sources using more than one organization 
from over 200 countries (Kaufmann et Al., 2011). WGIs are used in research as a measurement 
for institutional quality and governance (Daniel et Al., 2012). WGIs are measured as an 
estimated range, from approximately -2.5 to +2.5 and as a percentile ranking from 0 to 100 
(WGI, 2017). Daniel et al. (2012) examine the relationship between the WGI and corporate 
governance practice and find that the relationship was positively correlated, indicating that the 
development of corporate governance codes is affected by the development of the national 
institutions and the improvement of the governance indicators. WGI are determinants for shaping 
corporate governance rules and systems, motivating the engagement of stakeholders, and 
increasing the focus of corporate governance codes on shareholders’ interests (Zahra, 2014). 
Therefore, WGIs play an important role in the formation of corporate governance codes.  
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TABLE 2 
Definitions of Worldwide Governance Indicators 
WGI Definition 
Voice & 
accountability (VA) 
“Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media.” 
Political stability 
(PS) 
“Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically motivated violence and terrorism.” 
Government 
effectiveness (GE) 
“Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies.” 
Regulatory quality 
(RQ) 
“Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development.” 
Rule of law (RL) 
“Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.” 
Control of 
corruption (COC) 
“Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.” 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2011) 
Table 3 shows the average WGI for the MENA countries as measured in percentile rank for the 
period 2010-2015, which is obtained from the World Bank. It indicates that Saudi Arabia has the 
least freedom of expression, free media, freedom of association and the ability of people to select 
their government leaders (voice and accountability). In contrast, Tunisia is the highest-ranked 
country in voice and accountability. It is noted also that all MENA countries are measured as 
lower than the world average (50) in voice and accountability.  
Qatar and the UAE are ranked highest in the quality of contract enforcement, property rights and 
rules within society. Libya and Yemen are considered the lowest-ranked countries in terms of 
rule of law. From the regulatory quality perspective, Libya is found to be the lowest-ranked 
country in promoting private sector development, while Oman has the highest regulatory quality. 
Qatar has the highest political stability rank compared to other MENA countries, while Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen have the lowest political stability rank due to their high political disturbance 
that has continued after the Arab Spring. UAE is ranked as having the highest quality of public 
service compared to other MENA countries, while Libya and Yemen are perceived as having the 
lowest quality of public services. 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Worldwide Governance Indicators of MENA Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Khan (2006) explains the causality relationship between corruption, governance and economic 
development and identifies two consequences for this relationship. First, if corruption and low 
governance are the reasons for reducing economic growth, then poor countries should reduce 
corruption and establish good governance to ensure good economic development. Second, high-
income countries are more able to allocate more funds for law enforcement, reducing corruption 
and ensuring good governance. Accordingly, countries should achieve economic development to 
reduce corruption and implement good governance. Overall, corruption is associated with low 
corporate governance. It is clear from Table 3 that corruption is also a major problem in most 
MENA countries as seven countries (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syrian Arab 
Republic, and Yemen) are below average. This can be an indication for low governance. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
This paper investigates the corporate governance codes of MENA countries and their content. If 
a country has issued more than one code, we examine the code that is issued for non-financial 
listed companies. Furthermore, to avoid the double counting of codes, we include only the final 
Countries  COC GE PS RQ RL VA 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 33 27 9 34 39 18 
Iraq 6 12 3 11 3 16 
Jordan 61 58 29 57 65 26 
Kuwait 57 53 52 52 63 30 
Lebanon 18 43 6 49 27 34 
Libya 3 6 13 3 9 13 
Morocco 47 51 32 50 51 28 
Oman 62 62 65 68 68 19 
Qatar 84 78 87 72 80 23 
Saudi Arabia 57 57 33 55 62 3 
Syrian Arab Republic 8 16 4 10 16 4 
Tunisia 55 54 26 44 53 40 
United Arab Emirates 83 85 73 73 70 20 
Yemen, Rep. 7 9 1 23 9 10 
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version of each code. When analyzing the content of the codes, we focus on the main areas. 
These areas include corporate governance disclosures, stakeholders’, institutional investors’, 
shareholders’ rights and the responsibilities of the board of directors. The analysis of the codes is 
based on a checklist of 83 items extracted from the OECD principles. With the checklist, we 
evaluate whether the items mentioned in OECD principles can be found within a specific code. 
All the checklist items’ existence can be represented with a simple “1” or “0”. “1” means that the 
code contains a recommendation for a specific item of best practice specified in the OECD 
principles, which is assumed to contribute to improving corporate governance practices. “0” 
means that a recommendation is not present. Therefore, the higher the total sum of the checklist 
items are, the more code is converged with OECD principles and is assumed to contribute to 
corporate governance practice improvement. Obviously, a code contributes to enhancing 
corporate governance when the companies comply with the code recommendations and when 
compliance leads to changes in corporate governance practice.  
We build a comprehensive database of codes of corporate governance for a sample of 16 
countries. Therefore, this study offers one of the first comprehensive systematic analyses of the 
content, variability, and convergence of the MENA national corporate governance codes. 
Regarding the procedure to codify the items into codes, three coders initially developed the 
coding scheme for the sample, which has corporate governance codes available in English and 
Arabic. For consistency, our database includes only corporate governance codes per se. We 
exclude laws or legal regulations, reports on compliance with codes, consulting firm reports, and 
individual company codes. The actual national corporate governance codes and data related to 
the dates of code adoption were mostly obtained from the European Corporate Governance 
Institute website (ECGI, 2018). 
Consequently, we undertook a systematic online search, beginning with the website of the issuer 
as identified by ECGI, and then progressing to various stock exchange, industry, and government 
websites to search for the latest versions of the codes. Then, we split the codes into two 
subsamples (English and Arabic) and assigned each subsample to two different coders to codify 
them independently. Then, we matched every two sets of data to measure inter-rater reliability 
using the percentage agreement (Dewey, 1983). We found a high percentage of agreement of 
between 85 percent and 93 percent among the coders, which is an appropriate level of reliability. 
Finally, some items required further discussion and reconciliation due to a disagreement between 
the coders, and these were revised jointly to resolve the inconsistencies. An agreement was 
reached, and some elements were re-coded. 
As long as the corporate governance challenges are determined by the countries’ economic and 
institutional environments, we performed a further analysis to investigate the extent to which 
corporate governance codes may reflect both countries’ economic environments as well as key 
aspects of institutional environments for each country. Using this analysis, we attempted to 
identify patterns of association between institutional settings and the quality of the country code 
to explain the drivers behind convergence or divergence of corporate governance codes. 
5. RESULTS 
In this section, we present the results under the following five subtitles: Diffusion of the codes, 
convergence/divergence of the codes, peculiarities of the codes, association of economic 
indicators with the codes, and association of governance indicators with the codes.   
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5.1. Diffusion  
We describe our set of sample codes in Table 4. The table presents a listing of the codes’ initial 
adoption dates, the year of their first and most recent code revision, the total number of code 
revisions, the identity of their issuers, the application basis, references to OECD or any other 
transnational codes, and the title of the last code. 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Corporate Governance Codes of MENA Countries 
COUNTRY Issuing 
Entities 
Year of 
the first 
adoption 
Year of 
the first 
revision 
Year of 
last 
revision 
Number 
of 
revisions  
All codes 
including 
revisions 
as of 
2016 
Delay in 
code 
adoption 
Comply or 
explain 
Reference to 
transnational 
CODES 
Year and 
Title of Last 
Code 
Algeria Ministry of 
Small and 
Medium 
Enterprises 
and 
Handicraft 
2009 0 0 0 1 7 years Voluntary  OECD (2009) Code of 
Good 
Governance of 
the Institution 
in Algeria 
Bahrain The Ministry 
of Industry 
and 
Commerce 
2010 0 0 0 1 8 Years  Comply or 
Explain 
25 national 
and company 
codes from 
other 
countries 
(2010) The 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code of the 
Kingdom of 
Bahrain 
Egypt Egyptian 
Institute of 
Directors at 
the Egyptian 
Financial 
Supervisory 
Authority  
2005 2011 2016 2 3 3 years Voluntary  OECD (2016) The 
Egyptian code 
for Corporate 
Governance 
Jordan Ministry of 
Industry and 
Trade 
2008 2012 2012 1 2 6 years  Comply or 
Explain 
OECD (2012) 
Jordanian 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code  
Kuwait Capital 
Markets 
Authority 
2013 0 0 0 1 11 years  Comply No Reference (2013) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Regulations for 
Companies 
Regulated by 
Capital 
Markets 
Authority 
Lebanon Lebanese 
Transparency 
Association 
2006 2010 2010 1 2 4 years No 
application 
basis 
OECD Corporate 
Governance 
Guidelines for 
Listed 
Companies 
Libya Libyan Stock 
Market 
2007 0 0 0 1 5 years Comply or 
Explain 
No Reference (2007) Libyan 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code  
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Morocco Ministry of 
Economic 
and General 
Affairs 
2008 0 0 0 1 5 years Comply or 
Explain 
OECD Moroccan 
Code of Good 
Corporate 
Governance 
Practices 
Oman Capital 
Market 
Authority 
2002 2003 2015 4 5 First 
code in 
the 
region  
No 
application 
basis 
No Reference (2015) Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
for Publicly 
Listed 
Companies 
Palestinian  Capital 
Market 
Authority 
2009 0 0 0 1 7 years Comply or 
Explain 
OECD (2009) Code of 
Corporate 
Governance in 
Palestine 
Qatar Capital 
Market 
Authority 
2009 0 0 0 1 8 years Comply or 
Explain 
OECD, BIS, 
ICGN, IIF 
(2009) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code for 
Companies 
Listed in 
Markets 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Capital 
Market 
Authority 
2006 2010 2010 1 2 4 years Comply No Reference Corporate 
Governance 
Regulations 
Syria Central Bank 
of Syria  
2009 0 0 0 1 8 years Comply or 
Explain 
No Reference Governance 
Guide for 
Conventional 
Banks 
Operating in 
the Syrian 
Arab Republic 
Tunisia Arab 
Institute of 
Business 
Managers 
and the 
Center of 
International 
Private 
Enterprise 
2008 0 0 0 1 6 years No 
application 
basis 
No Reference Code of Best 
Practices of 
Corporate 
Governance 
UAE Dubai SME 2011 0 0 0 1 9 years Voluntary  No Reference The Corporate 
Governance 
Code for Small 
and Medium 
Enterprises 
Yemen The Yemeni 
Businessmen 
Club (YBC) 
and the 
Center for 
International 
Private 
Enterprise 
(CIPE) 
2010 0 0 0 1 8 years Voluntary  OECD Corporate 
Governance 
Code 
The first formal adoption of a national code of corporate governance for our sample countries 
occurred in 2002 in Oman. Oman was the first country in the region to issue a code of corporate 
governance for companies whose shares are listed on the Muscat Securities Market. The most 
recent adoption examined in this study occurred in 2013 in Kuwait. Interestingly, among our 
sample countries, Oman has revised its code four times. This is followed by Egypt, which has 
revised its code two times. A few have revised their codes only once (Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Saudi Arabia). One of the most distinguishing features of the remainder of the countries is that 
they have never revised their codes. 
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It is important to understand who the issuers of corporate governance codes are in different 
countries. Identifying these actors provides information regarding the source of motivation 
(Aguilera and Cazurra, 2004). The issuer type indicates why codes are developed and how 
strongly they are enforced. The type of corporate governance code issuers includes (1) the capital 
market authority in five countries (Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Palestine and Saudi Arabia); (2) the 
government in four countries, when the issuer is one of its ministries (Ministry of Small and 
Medium Enterprises and Handicraft in Algeria, Ministry of Industry and Commerce in Bahrain, 
Ministry of Industry and Trade in Jordan and Ministry of Economic and General Affairs in 
Morocco); (3) a directors’ association, only in Egypt (Egyptian Institute of Directors); (4) 
managers’ association, only in Tunisia (Arab Institute of business managers); (5) investors’ 
association, only in Yemen (Yemeni Businessmen’s Club); (6) stock exchange, only in Libya; 
and (7) other bodies such as the Lebanese Transparency Association, Central Bank of Syria and 
Dubai SME.   
Efficiency and legitimation trigger corporate governance code adoption. Efficiency is mostly 
endogenously driven, while legitimation could be exogenously motivated. The issuer type 
explains the institutional pressure and the motivation to develop a corporate governance code. 
Coercive isomorphic pressures exist when codes are issued by investors’ bodies and by the stock 
exchange to enhance efficiency. In these cases, the code instructions are included in the 
requirements for publicly traded firms, as well as demands from institutional investors. In 
contrast, normative isomorphism pressures exist when the codes are issued by directors’ 
associations and the government to maintain legitimacy. Last, mimetic isomorphism may exist 
when codes are issued by managers’ associations because other successful peer associations 
might have adopted such codes.  
We find that most of the codes were issued by the capital market. This reveals the active role of 
coercive issuers. Endogenous forces stimulate codes adoption in MENA countries to improve the 
efficiency of the corporate governance system; however, exogenous forces appear to be weak in 
MENA countries. These countries are not heavily influenced by globalization, information 
technology development or opening of financial markets to international investors. Although half 
of the sample countries refer to the OECD principles as a reference for preparing the corporate 
governance code, there is neither harmonization of corporate governance systems nor 
convergence between the codes in MENA countries, as we will see later. Endogenous forces may 
cause divergence of the content of corporate governance codes in MENA due to different 
institutional settings. The content of the codes tends to reflect the peculiarities of each country’s 
distinct institutional environment. This means that the adopted governance principles in the 
codes are ‘decoupled’ from legitimation concerns and focus more on efficiency goals. 
The codes of the MENA countries are, when mentioned, non-legally binding and mostly based 
on voluntarily or the “comply-or-explain” principle, allowing companies to diverge from 
corporate governance codes principles. The deviation in applying code principles may reflect 
specific characteristics of corporate governance systems of MENA countries as endogenous 
forces. 
5.2. Convergence/divergence of the Codes 
Based on the checklist of the details that were highlighted in the methodology section, we 
investigated the convergence/divergence of MENA countries’ codes to the OECD principles 
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under seven subsections; scope, reference to the regulatory framework, shareholder rights, 
stakeholder rights, institutional investors, board responsibilities, and disclosure (Table 5). In 
doing so, we wanted to outline the strengths and weaknesses of the codes for each specific 
section and the overall quality of each country’s code. 
Overall, there is wide variation among countries regarding the convergence level to OECD 
principles, ranging between 31% and 73%. The high-scoring countries include Morocco (73%), 
Kuwait (72%), Bahrain (66%), Egypt (61%), Qatar (60%), and Jordan (60%), whereas the low-
scoring countries are the United Arab Emirates (31%), Libya (43%), and Algeria (43%) (Table 
5). The following subheadings highlight the extent of the convergence/divergence of the codes 
between MENA and the benchmarking of OECD principles. 
TABLE 5 
Coverage of Codes of MENA Countries 
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Algeria 3 5 15 0 2 1 10 36 43% 
Bahrain 4 6 11 1 1 11 21 55 66% 
Egypt  4 4 9 0 2 14 18 51 61% 
Jordan 3 3 11 1 4 12 16 50 60% 
Kuwait 1 5 18 0 4 10 22 60 72% 
Lebanon 1 2 15 0 2 11 16 47 57% 
Libya 1 2 12 0 1 5 15 36 43% 
Morocco  3 4 18 0 4 12 20 61 73% 
Oman 1 3 5 0 0 12 20 41 49% 
Palestine 2 5 15 0 3 6 18 49 59% 
Qatar  1 4 11 0 3 12 19 50 60% 
Saudi 
Arabia 1 4 12 2 3 5 18 45 54% 
Syria  0 3 5 0 3 9 20 40 48% 
Tunisia 0 2 9 0 3 7 20 41 49% 
UAE 1 3 7 0 1 6 8 26 31% 
Yemen 4 3 13 0 4 9 14 47 57% 
5.2.1. Scope  
This subsection includes four classifications to ascertain the scope of each code in terms of the 
companies targeted by the code, such as listed or non-listed companies or both, or SMEs. The 
results indicate that the codes predominantly address listed companies. This implies that the 
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codes aim to regulate stock markets and mitigate agency problems. Enhancing the stock markets 
could be motivated by either the efficiency that refers to the demand for codes from investors or 
the legitimacy that refers to the interest in attracting foreign investments. Furthermore, Tunisian 
and Syrian codes do not address a specific and clear target, which is the missing link between the 
codes and their implementers. On the other hand, while some codes concern only listed 
companies (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Libya), some other countries (Jordan, 
Bahrain, Morocco, Yemen, Egypt) address almost all types of companies, including listed and 
non-listed companies and SMEs. 
 
 
5.2.2. Reference to Regulatory Framework 
This dimension investigates the aim of the code, whether it refers to the regulatory framework, 
enforcement of compliance, and other issues, comprising seven items. The results revealed that 
all countries except Syria outline the aim of the code; refer to the regulatory framework in some 
way, excluding Libya; and highlight the application basis (i.e., comply or explain), excluding 
Lebanon and Tunisia. However, only 50% of the codes receive the support of stock market 
regulation, and only Palestinian and Bahraini codes mandate the compulsory adoption of the 
principles of the codes; none addresses the cross-border co-operation of regulators in formulating 
the codes. 
5.2.3. Shareholder Rights  
This section investigates the extent to which codes articulate the rights of shareholders. 
Providing shareholders with information on a timely and regular basis, equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, voting in general meetings, electing a board of directors, the rights of minority 
shareholders, and the right to question the board are among the commonly cited principles. Most 
of the codes underline rights of shareholders to place an item on the agenda of general meetings, 
participate in corporate decisions, have information about the date, location, and agenda of 
general meetings, and proxy voting. However, some issues have received very little attention, 
such as the establishment of anti-takeover devices, secure ownership registration, cross-border 
voting, approval of dividend distributions by shareholders, approval of any changes in economic 
or voting rights, shareholder approval of compensation schemes, the rights of different classes of 
shareholders, and electronic voting in absentia. Surprisingly, one of the basic rights of 
shareholders, such as dividends, was not mentioned by seven codes.  
5.2.4. Stakeholder Rights  
The analysis indicates that the stakeholders’ section, which contains six items, is one of the 
weakest sections of the codes. While most of the codes mention the rights of stakeholders, 
including information rights, they fail to address the redress of stakeholders for violations of 
their rights, stakeholders’ communication rights with the board, and creditor rights, with a few 
exceptions. Employee participation in corporate governance is cited in seven codes. 
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5.2.5. Institutional Investors  
This subsection reports the results of the analysis regarding the evaluation of whether the codes 
consider the interaction with and rights and responsibilities of institutional investors. The results 
indicate that this is the weakest section of MENA countries’ codes; they almost never touch the 
issue, with a few exceptions (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain). Thus, these countries have yet to 
explore the power of institutional investors on certain policies of companies (David et al., 1998; 
David et al., 2001).  
5.2.6. Board Responsibilities  
The board responsibility section, which comprises 23 items, is one of the strengths of the MENA 
codes. The analysis results have shown that all codes establish the criteria for board composition 
and independence. The majority clarify the responsibilities of the board, require the 
establishment of three primary board committees (i.e., audit, nomination, and remuneration), and 
advise the separation of the roles of chairpersons and the chief executive officer. However, key 
roles undertaken by independent board members are disclosed by only five countries’ codes 
(Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates). While nine countries address 
transparency in the board nomination and election process, the remaining seven countries fail to 
do so. Measuring the boards’ performance as well as managerial performance are among 
frequently addressed topics in MENA codes. To ensure that directors allocate enough time to 
matters of corporations, half of the codes limit multiple directorships, while the other half do not 
have any such restriction. In MENA countries, where family ownership and state ownership are 
high, board nomination, the selection process and the roles of independent board members are 
critical in the healthy functioning of markets and preserving the rights of individual investors. 
5.2.7. Disclosure  
This section measures the extent to which the codes prescribe the disclosure of 16 specific items. 
Although disclosure of some themes (i.e., financial information, non-financial information, 
ownership structure, and executive remuneration) are addressed by most  of the codes, disclosure 
of some items is not common among MENA codes, such as the selection process of directors, the 
roles and responsibilities of the CEO and Chair, issues regarding employees and other 
stakeholders, the quality of auditing and auditor-client relationships. Moreover, information 
dissemination channels are commonly noted by all codes except one (Algeria). 
 
5.3. Peculiarities of the Codes 
Codes tend to reflect the peculiarities of each country’s distinct governance environment. In this 
section, we explain the main peculiarities of the national corporate governance codes of the 
MENA countries. 
The Kuwaiti code assigns Rule No. 11 to outline the importance of social responsibility, which 
highlights that the social responsibility in business relies on two pillars. The first is the 
company's compliance to act morally according to laws and general norms. The second is 
sustainable participation to achieve economic and social development through the attraction of 
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national labor, improving the living conditions of laborers and their families, the local 
community, and the whole society and allocating a percentage of the achieved profits for social 
services and projects, provided that this allocation matches the nature and volume of the 
company's activities and the achieved profits. In the same context, the Omani code devotes 
principle No.  13 for corporate social responsibility. It highlights that the company shall mitigate 
any adverse impact of its activities on the national economy, community or environment at large. 
Similarly, Section 7 in the Tunisian code highlights the importance of corporate social 
responsibility because the socially responsible investments feature the most successful 
companies. 
The corporate governance code of the UAE, as issued for SMEs, focus on pillar 9: family 
governance to set out the family’s relationship with the business. It highlights that when the 
family and business become more complex, families should establish a “family council” to 
institutionalize cooperation and link the family and the business. In the same vein, the Yemeni 
code focuses on family governance in its appendix. It states that family businesses should 
establish a family constitution and a family council. The importance of establishing a family 
council is mentioned by the Tunisian code as well. Similarly, the Algerian corporate governance 
code targets mainly small and medium family enterprises. In the first part of the code, Section 3 
highlights the challenges that preclude this type of enterprise from continuing and flourishing. 
Moreover, in the second part, Section 2 presents the relationships of the enterprise with external 
parties, including public authorities, customers, suppliers, banks, employees and competitors. It 
focuses on the importance of managing the succession process. This transmission process is also 
mentioned in the Tunisian code, which assigns Section 9 to good corporate governance practices 
in family firms. 
The corporate governance code of Bahrain assigns principle No. 9 to “Islamic” companies. The 
code requires that these companies follow the principles of Islamic sharia law. Furthermore, the 
code highlights that these companies are subject to additional governance requirements and 
disclosures to provide assurance to stakeholders that they are following sharia principles. Each 
company should establish a Sharia Supervisory Board consisting of at least three Sharia scholars. 
5.4. Association of Economic Indicators with the Codes 
The examination of the codes’ content yielded a wide range of differences based on the checklist 
we established across countries. As some countries’ codes have high convergence, others have 
low convergence. Thus, they tend to diverge from one another compared to OECD principles. 
Unfortunately, these variances among countries do not appear to be precisely associated with 
economic factors. While some oil-rich countries have high convergence with the OECD 
checklist analysis, others have quite low convergence. Making the same inference for non-oil 
rich countries is possible. For example, while Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as oil-rich countries, 
have codes that strongly converge with OECD principles, other countries in the same league 
have low converging codes. On the other hand, some non-oil-rich countries have well-developed 
codes, such as Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt, and some others do not, such as Tunisia and Syria.  
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Concerning GDP growth and GDP per capita, there are no consistent findings between high 
growth and low growth countries. For example, while Kuwait, Egypt, and Jordan are among the 
low growth countries with relatively high code convergence, Qatar, Palestine, and Bahrain are 
high growth countries with high convergence rates with OECD principles. Thus, there is no 
evidence of whether the economic growth is associated with the convergence or divergence of 
the codes to the OECD principles. 
As outlined in the literature review section, stock market development is an important impetus of 
code development. In the sample, some countries, which have high market capitalization to GDP 
ratios such as Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, have high convergence with OECD 
principles. On the other hand, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, and Tunisia have the lowest market 
capitalization to GDP ratios. However, the first three countries have above 50% convergence 
with OECD principles. Thus, there is no certain and clear link between stock market 
development and code convergence/divergence. 
Across MENA countries, there is great variety in providing credit to the private sector, ranging 
between 5.77% (in Yemen) and 95.55% (in Lebanon) as a percentage of GDP. The highest credit 
providers, such as Lebanon, Tunisia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Morocco, have high convergence 
with OECD principles. Among the lowest credit providers to the private sector, Algeria and 
Libya have convergence rates of less than 50%, whereas Egypt, Yemen, and Palestine have 
convergence rates of more than 50%. Hence, the association between credit provision to the 
private sector and code development is not explicit. 
The economic indicators elaborated above do not appear to be directly linked to the convergence 
or divergence of the codes with the OECD principles. Therefore, we provide two possible 
interpretations of the results. First, as countries that have high economic growth rates, market 
capitalization, and credit provision ratios also have high convergence scores, we find that in 
these countries, economic efficiency acts as the impetus of code development because this 
contributes to economic efficiency. Second, countries with poor economic indicators but high 
convergence might be hoping that code development can improve economic conditions. 
5.5. Association of Governance Indicators with the Codes  
In this section, we investigate the relationship between the governance indicators and the 
convergence of codes with the OECD principles, through conducting two analyses, to find 
whether these codes reflect the governance quality. First, we analyzed this relationship by 
comparing each code convergence level with the overall average of governance indicators for 
each country, as shown in Figure 1. The results revealed that there is a deviation between the 
code convergence and the governance quality. It is evidenced that there is a gap between the 
convergence of codes with OECD principles and governance quality for all countries. Although 
Qatar and the UAE have good institutional quality, their codes do not converge with OECD 
principles. This indicates that governance environments are not aligned with the development of 
corporate governance codes and their convergence with OECD principles. 
FIGURE 1 
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Overall Governance Indicators and Quality of Code 
 
Then, we analyzed this relationship by examining the relationship between each governance 
indicator and the code convergence, as indicated in Figure 2 demonstrates. Examining the 
relationship between the COC and the code convergence indicates that the highest level of 
deviation was clear in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine, which means that the 
codes of these countries are overestimating their actual institutional and governance abilities. In 
other words, the governance environment is not reflected in code coverage. Examining the 
relationship between the RQ and the code convergence indicates that the highest level of 
deviation was clear in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The incompatibility 
between the PS and code convergence is clearly observable in most countries. Regarding the rule 
of law, seven countries (Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United 
Arab Emirates) have positive deviations, which means that they have high-quality governance 
environments in terms of the rule of law, which is not reflected in their code convergence. VA is 
a clear problem for all MENA countries because all countries are below the code convergence 
averages level. This indicates that people in these countries are not able to express their opinions 
or enjoy enough freedom, which might affect the perception of governance quality negatively. 
The deviation between the code convergence and GE was negative in countries such as Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen.  
FIGURE 2 
Individual Governance Indicators and Quality of Code 
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The two-level analysis indicates a gap between the scores of codes convergence and the overall 
governance quality. Having a good governance environment does not guarantee to have good 
code. 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study aims at investigating the convergence or divergence of the corporate governance 
codes between MENA countries and comparing them with the globally known OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance. The sample of the study is the corporate governance codes of the 
MENA countries. The data collection methodology is a qualitative content analysis of the codes, 
which is supported by a quantitative analysis of the corporate governance convergence and its 
relationship with economic indicators and governance environment quality. 
We have identified that the first formal adoption of a national code of corporate governance in 
our sample countries occurs in 2002 in Oman, while the most recent adoption examined in this 
study occurs in 2013 in Kuwait. In the meantime, most of the countries have never revised their 
codes or have revised them only once, except Oman and Egypt, which revised their codes more 
than once. With the increase of globalization and the developments regarding corporate 
governance around the world, MENA countries are expected to modify their codes more often 
accordingly.  
Concerning the issuers of codes in MENA countries, several bodies, including most stock 
markets and other organizations, initiated the code regulation. This reveals the active role of 
coercive issuers as endogenous forces; thus, exogenous forces appear to be weak in MENA 
countries. Moreover, most codes are based on a voluntary or “comply-or-explain” principle, 
which does not enforce implementation of the code principles. All codes somehow refer to a 
regulatory framework except Libya; however, only 50% of the codes are supported by stock 
market regulation. Furthermore, none of the codes addresses the cross-border co-operation of 
regulators in formulating the codes. 
The analyses of the codes by benchmarking OECD principles revealed that codes commonly 
enact principles regarding shareholders, board responsibilities, and disclosure, although they do 
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not address all expected principles. For example, in shareholders rights, some issues received 
very little attention, such as cross-border voting, approval of dividend distributions by 
shareholders, shareholder approval of compensation schemes, rights of different classes of 
shareholders, and electronic voting in absentia. Surprisingly, one of the basic rights of 
shareholders, dividends, is never mentioned by seven codes. In the board responsibilities section, 
all codes are not equivalently transparent in the board nomination and election process which is a 
primary mechanism in alleviating agency problems; thus, they are advised to consider this point 
in further code amendments. The disclosure sections of the codes can also be better formulated 
by highlighting several major issues for transparency, such as the selection process of directors, 
the roles and responsibilities of the CEO and Chair, and issues regarding employees and other 
stakeholders because disclosure is the only means for outsiders to obtain information from the 
company. However, the codes are overall weak in referring to stakeholder rights and institutional 
investors. This might be attributable to the lack of institutional investors in the ownership 
structure of corporations as most of these countries depend on family businesses.  
The economic factors elaborated in the relevant section do not appear to be directly linked to the 
convergence or divergence score of the codes to the OECD principles. Therefore, we provide 
two alternative inferences from the results. First, countries that have high economic growth rates, 
market capitalization, and credit provision ratio also have high convergence scores. In these 
countries, economic efficiency acts as the impetus of code development, or code development 
contributes to economic efficiency. Second, countries with poor economic factors that have high 
convergence scores might be hoping that code development can serve for the improvement of 
economic conditions. This means that the adopted governance principles in the codes are 
‘decoupled’ from legitimation concerns and focus more on efficiency goals. 
The governance environment and the institutional quality of MENA countries are not aligned 
with their codes. A deviation between the average governance and code convergence was 
addressed in most MENA countries. Syria, Yemen, Libya, Palestine, and Egypt are found to 
have the most deviations, and they face many problems in terms of COC, GE, RL, RQ, VA, and 
PS. The main reason for these deviations is related to their political instability and the Arab 
Spring revolutions. The UAE and Qatar have good governance environments, although their 
codes are not as compatible with OECD principles, especially the UAE. 
The study provides several important implications and lessons to be learned for the regulators, 
firms and other stakeholders. First, the adoption of corporate governance codes of MENA 
countries is relatively late compared to those of developed countries. To close the gap and stay 
competitive in the global market, they need to strive for the enactment of best practices of 
corporate governance principles immediately and revise them in a timely manner. Although 
some of the countries (i.e., Oman and Egypt) within the sample of the study have updated their 
codes several times, others have not done yet so. Second, the regulatory bodies of corporate 
governance codes are quite diverse in these countries. This is good to learn the expectations of 
different stakeholders and consider and utilize their diverse experiences in the code development 
process. However, although capital market authority is the primary regulators in most of the 
countries, it is not in some others. We recommend those countries to incorporate capital market 
authority into the code development process to better consider the expectations of investors both 
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local and foreign as well as individual and institutional. This is a principal requirement to 
mitigate agency problems and to make firms attractive for domestic and foreign investors.  
Third, “comply-or-explain” or “voluntary” base of adoption of the codes is non-legally binding. 
These countries need to assess the adoption degree of the codes by the firms under this condition. 
If regulators recognize that it opens the door for significant deviations from the principles or 
major non-compliance of the codes, they may need to consider replacement of them with 
“comply” base. Fourth, all codes need to determine their scopes and target organizations 
precisely so that the implementers will position themselves accordingly. Fifth, weakly structured 
sections of the codes (i.e., shareholder rights, stakeholder rights, and institutional investors) need 
to be strengthened in the next revisions. Indeed, to improve the development of the codes, 
regulators are recommended to listen to various stakeholders such as institutions, implementers, 
and investors so that they will find the opportunity to address missing principles. Sixth, we could 
not find a consistent trend between economic development and coverage of the codes in this 
study which might be because most of the countries have developed their codes in recent years. 
Thus, it might yet be early to assess their effect on economic development. A similar study that 
will be replicated later might yield more stable and interesting results. Alternative explanations 
have been already provided in the preceding sections on the association between coverages of the 
codes and economic development. 
Moreover, the gap between macro governance environment and development of high-quality 
code might signal a lack of interaction between two sides. Cooperation between institutions and 
regulators (i.e. code developers) during the code development process to produce a high quality 
code is advised. In addition, for these countries to integrate into world economy and lessen their 
dependence on oil and gas through diversification, enactment of high quality codes is of crucial 
importance. Finally, during the code development process, firms, investors, and other 
stakeholders should be invited to share their opinions and experiences because they might have 
different perspectives than regulators. A corporate governance code commission might be 
established involving representatives of a variety of stakeholders (Krenn, 2016). This is likely to 
enhance and contribute better development and implementation of the principles of the codes. 
The study has few limitations. Although we attempted to establish a comprehensive checklist of 
items, it is not exhaustive, which can be modified for further studies. Second, even though we 
have taken all the possible precautions to secure the reliability of the data collection, there is a 
limitation inherent in qualitative studies. Third, the study is limited to MENA countries. For 
further studies, the methodology of the paper can be adopted in other countries and regions.   
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